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An  Evaluation  of  Pricing Performance
and Hedging  Effectiveness  of the
Barley  Futures Market
Colin  A.  Carter
This  paper  investigates  the pricing  efficiency  and hedging  effectiveness  of the  Winnipeg
barley futures market,  using the Chicago corn futures market  as a norm.  Several  tests of pricing
efficiency  were  conducted and the stability  of the basis was studied.  The barley  futures market
operates  in a  heavily  regulated  economic  environment  and  this  is  shown  to impact  on  both
price behavior  and hedging opportunities.
The  behavior  of  commodity  futures
prices  always  has  drawn  attention  in the
economics  literature  and this  interest  ex-
tends  from  well-established  to  newly-
formed markets.  Studies of price behavior
on  futures  markets  have  been  primarily
concerned with both pricing efficiency and
hedging  opportunities.  A  price  efficient
market can be briefly  described  as  one in
which  new  information  concerning  sup-
ply  or  demand  is  discounted  accurately
and rapidly into the futures price.  On the
other  hand,  hedging  opportunities  are  a
function of  basis  behavior.
The primary  objective  of this  paper  is
to assess the pricing efficiency of the Win-
nipeg  feed  barley  futures  market.  In  ad-
dition, the effectiveness  of hedging on the
market  is  studied.  Price  behavior  on  the
barley  market  is  compared  with  that on
the  Chicago  Board of  Trade  (CBT)  corn
market.  The  corn futures  market  is  used
as  a  norm  because  it  is  considered  to  be
one of the most efficient in terms of price
discovery  (Gray)  and  it  operates  without
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many of the regulatory  constraints which
impinge  on the barley  futures  market.
Theoretical and Methodological
Framework
Empirical  work  on  efficient  markets
measures  the adjustment  of market prices
to  a particular  information  set.  In  his  re-
view of studies in security  markets, Fama
classified  efficient  market  tests  into three
groups:  weak,  semi-strong  and  strong
form.  The information  set for weak-form
tests is confined to historical market prices.
Semi-strong  form  tests measure  the mar-
ket's  adjustment  to  historical  prices  plus
all other  relevant  public  information  and
strong  form  tests  measure  its adjustment
to  "inside"  information  not  available  to
the public.  This paper provides three dif-
ferent weak-form  tests for barley and corn
futures.
Structured  as  a  weak-form  analysis,  a
naive statistical  test of the  martingale hy-
pothesis  is  presented  first.  The  null  hy-
pothesis  under this test is that prices  (and
returns)  in  an  efficient  market  are  nor-
mally expected to follow a martingale  sto-
chastic  process  throughout time  (Samuel-
son).  A martingale is a stochastic sequence
of variables and  its major characteristic  is
that the conditional expected value of the
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random  variable for time t +  1 equals the
value for time t.1Stevenson and Bear have
applied  this  test to corn  and  soybean  fu-
tures.
The  second  efficiency  test  is  a  test  of
the  theory  of  normal  backwardation,
which  was  postulated  by  Keynes.  In  de-
veloping  the  theory,  Keynes  emphasized
the financial  burden  posed by  the  neces-
sity for carrying  inventories of agricultur-
al products and he suggested futures mar-
kets exist to facilitate hedging. He argued
that futures prices are unreliable estimates
of the cash or spot price prevailing  on the
date of expiry of the futures contract and
thus it is  "normal"  for the futures price to
be  a  downward-biased  estimate  of  the
forthcoming spot price.  This theory, in ef-
fect,  suggests  that  speculators  sell  insur-
ance  to  hedgers  and  that  the  market  is
normally  inefficient  because  the  futures
price  is  not  an  unbiased  estimate  of  the
subsequent  spot price.
A  major  implication  of  the  theory  of
normal  backwardation  (which  assumes
hedgers  are continuously  net short)  is that
a  strategy  of maintaining  a  long  position
in the futures market should earn  positive
profits over  time.  To test  this implication
in this paper, a simple  theoretical  trading
routine  was  conducted  with  past  Winni-
peg  barley  and  Chicago  corn  futures
prices. This test was first used by Gray and
it  simply  consists  of  hypothetically  pur-
chasing  each  futures  contract  on the first
trading day  in the delivery  month of the
preceding  futures  contract  and then  sell-
ing it  on the  first  trading day  of  its  own
delivery  month.  This  test  is only  valid  in
a nontrending  market  because  if there is
an upward trend  in  cash  prices, the  pro-
cedure  may indicate  a bias  exists when  it
does  not.
Cootner argued that Keynes' hypothesis
There  are exceptions to this naive rule as Danthine
and  Lucas  have both  shown  theoretically  that  pe-
riodical  failure  of  the martingale  property  to hold
is  not evidence  of market  inefficiency.
implies futures prices should not necessar-
ily  rise  until  after  the  peak  of  net  short
hedging has passed and he interpreted the
theory to mean  seasonal trends in futures
prices should be taken  as an indication of
a risk premium.  This interpretation  is also
tested  in this  study by  assuming  specula-
tors take  both long  and  short futures  po-
sitions.
The  theory  of  normal  backwardation
has  recently  been  subjected  to more  rig-
orous  tests than  Gray's  (for example,  see
Dusak  and Carter  et al.). However,  since
the major purpose  of this paper  is to con-
duct  a  relative  rather  than  an  absolute
analysis  of  efficiency,  the  Gray  test  has
sufficient  merit as a weak-form  test.
The third test  for efficiency  in this  pa-
per  is  an  examination  of  the  forecasting
ability of the barley futures market vis-a-
vis  the corn  futures  market.  The spring-
time  forecast  of  a  post-harvest  price  is
evaluated  for a number of years by  com-
puting  the mean square  prediction  error.
Tomek and Gray, and later Kofi, were the
first to  test  the  forecasting  ability  of the
futures market within the context  of mar-
ket efficiency.  They challenged Working's
reluctance  to  view  futures  price  quota-
tions for storable commodities  as forecasts
and they argued  that  inventories  of stor-
able  commodities  provide  a  linkage  be-
tween  the  springtime  prices  of  the  post-
harvest  futures  and  the  subsequent  har-
vest time prices, which helps to make the
futures price a self-fulfilling forecast. They
estimated  the  coefficients  of  the  linear
regression  equation:  Ph = a  +  PPfh +  eh,
where  Ph = cash  price  at  harvest  time,
Pfh = planting  time  futures  quotation  for
harvest time contract,  and eh = error term.
A "perfect  forecast"  was  deemed one for
which a and  f  were estimated  to be zero
and unity, respectively.  Both studies found
that  the  forward  pricing  function  of  fu-
tures  markets  was  more  reliable  for  con-
tinuous  than  for  discontinuous  inventory
markets. Leuthold, Martin and Garcia, and
Stein  have  subsequently  investigated  the
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forecasting  efficiency  of  futures  markets
using a similar approach of regressing cash
prices on lagged futures  prices.
Finally,  the  hedging  effectiveness  of
barley relative to corn is investigated.  One
of  the  traditional  purposes  of  a  futures
market  is  to  provide  primary  producers
and grain merchants an opportunity to re-
duce  price  variability  through  hedging.
The effectiveness  of  hedging is  estimated
in this paper by regressing changes in cash
prices  on  changes  in  futures  prices.  The
results  provide  estimates  of both  the  op-
timal  (minimum-risk)  hedge  ratio  as  a
proportion  of  the  cash  position  and  the
degree  to  which  price  variance  could  be
reduced through hedging.
Institutional Considerations
Barley futures have been traded  on the
Winnipeg  Commodity  Exchange  (WCE)
in  one  form  or  another  almost  continu-
ously  since  1912.  However,  from  the late
1940s  until  1974  the  Canadian  Wheat
Board  (CWB), a government agency,  had
monopoly  selling  privileges  for  all  inter-
provincial  and  export  sales  and  this  se-
verely restricted the functioning of the fu-
tures market.
The  barley  futures  contract  was  later
rewritten  as a feed grain contract  in  1974
when  the Canadian government  changed
the feed grain policy by creating  a "dual"
marketing  system  for  barley.  This  new
structure  allowed  for  domestic  producer
sales  of  barley either  through  the  "open-
market"  commercial  grain  companies  or
through the CWB and it thus reduced the
role of the CWB in the marketing  of bar-
ley.  Open-market  transactions  now  dom-
inate  domestic  sales  and  they  center
around  the  barley  futures  market.  This
policy  change  still did  not  create  a  truly
competitive  barley  market,  however.  To
date,  there  remain  four  critical  regula-
tions  which  restrict  competitive  market
forces  from  freely  operating.  Firstly,  the
CWB  continues  to regulate  producer  de-
livery  quotas  on open-market  sales  (since
August  1979)  and  thus  open-market  de-
mand cannot always be  satisfied.  Second-
ly,  the  open-market  transactions  are  for
domestic  usage  only  and  thus there  is  a
lack of arbitrage between the domestic and
world barley  markets.  Thirdly,  the CWB
makes domestic  barley sales at a regulated
corn-competitive 2 price  which  periodi-
cally acts  as  a ceiling on open-market  fu-
tures  prices.  Finally,  the  CWB  sets  "ini-
tial" barley prices each crop year and these
often serve  as  a domestic  floor price.
In contrast to the Chicago corn market,
the  Winnipeg  barley  futures  market thus
operates  within  a  number  of  regulatory
constraints, such as those mentioned above.
An elaboration  of the economics  of these
restrictions  is found  in Carter.  The  major
effect of the government  regulations  is to
inhibit the reflection  of world supply  and
demand  fundamentals  for  barley  on  the
barley  futures market.
Undoubtedly,  the  price  performance
and  hedging  opportunities  on the  barley
market  will  differ  from  the  corn  market
because  of  the  differing  economic  envi-
ronments  they operate  within.  In  a  wel-
fare  assessment  we might  expect  a priori
that the  Canadian  regulations  have  both
positive  (e.g., price  stabilizing)  and  nega-
tive  (e.g., constrained  arbitrage  opportu-
nities) impacts on the barley  market par-
ticipants,  with  the  net  effect  being
uncertain.  The  motivation  for  this  paper
stems  from  the  question  as  to  how  well
the barley market performs,  relative to the
corn  market,  in  light  of the  considerable
amount of institutional regulation  in Can-
ada.
2 The corn competitive  price  is calculated  on  the ba-
sis of importing corn and soybean meal into Canada
from  the  U.S.  Corn  and  soybean  meal  prices  are
then converted into "equivalent"  feed  barley prices
on the  basis  of  digestible  energy  and  protein  con-
tent.  This  regulated  price  for  barley  has  been  in
place  since  1976.
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TABLE  1. Serial  Correlation  Coefficients for First Differences  between  the  Natural  Logs of
Daily Feed  Grain  December  Futures  1977-81.
Time  Lag (1-24)
Com-  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12
modity  Year  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24
Corn  1977  .05  -. 08  .00  -. 05  .05  .08  .08  -. 08  -. 04  .07  .03  .04
.10  -. 08  -. 05  .00  .08  .05  -. 01  .10  .07  -. 01  .07  -. 01
1978  .02  -. 09  .02  .03  .07  .00  .02  .11  -. 04  .03  .02  .04
-.01  .05  -. 07  -. 07  .12  .18a  .00  -. 14a  -. 04  -. 04  -. 02  -. 02
1979  -. 10  .13a  -. 04  .01  .06  -. 04  .12  .01  .04  .06  -. 03  -.03
.03  -. 18a  .03  -. 09  .03  -. 05  -. 07  .00  .03  .05  -. 13  .09
1980  -. 03  -. 08  .03  .07  -. 02  -. 12  .12  -. 08  -. 07  -. 02  .03  .02
-. 09  .15a  .02  -. 04  .00  .05  -. 02  -. 02  .16  -. 05  -.03  -.06
1981  .03  -. 06  .07  -. 03  -. 09  .04  .04  .03  -. 11  .01  .05  -. 09
-. 03  .16a  -. 02  -. 03  .05  .06  .02  -.01  .05  -.01  -. 02  -. 09
Barley  1977  -. 04  -. 14  .16a  -. 06  -. 03  -. 01  .00  .04  -. 02  .02  .11  .00
-.15  .09  .06  -. 10  .05  .13  .14  -. 03  -. 04  .06  .13  -. 14
1978  .04  -. 08  -. 10  -. 10  .01  .08  -. 07  -. 02  .03  -. 02  .07  .04
-. 01  -. 03  .06  -. 05  .12  .03  -.16a  .02  .04  .01  -. 06  -. 14
1979  .09  -. 02  -. 14a  -. 03  .01  .03  .03  -. 01  .01  -. 01  -. 06  .04
-. 03  -. 12  -. 07  .00  -. 09  -.13  .02  .11  .13  -.13  -. 12  -.14a
1980  .06  -. 05  -. 08  -. 08  -. 08  .08  .07  -. 06  -. 12  -. 08  -. 02  .02
.07  .01  -. 03  -. 08  -. 06  .10  -.03  .03  .06  -. 10  -.12  .07
1981  .08  -. 09  .03  -.09  .00  .00  .06  -. 08  .01  .04  -. 02  .13
-. 08  -. 02  .04  -. 06  -. 02  .03  .05  -. 02  -. 03  -. 06  -. 01  .05
a  Statistically significant,  i.e.,  difference is more than twice the standard error.
T-k
The Martingale Hypothesis  ~  (R  - R)(R+k  - R)
Pk  t=  (1)
This section provides a naive weak-form  (R -R)
test  for  efficiency;  a  test  of  the  random  t =l
walk  or the  more general  martingale  hy-  where  k  is  the  lag  between  observations
pothesis.  The  results  reported  in  Table  1  1  T
for barley and corn  are based  on first dif-  and  R  =  1  R,  is the sample  mean.
ferences  of the natural logarithms  of daily
closing December futures prices. The data
were organized for consecutive days with-
in  a trading year and the  1977-81  period  A  large  and  statistically  significant  de
of futures  market  returns  were analyzed.  gree of serial  dependence  (Pk)  would sug-
These  data were obtained  from the Win-  gest  that the time  series  Rt,  Rt+,  . RT
nipeg Commodity Exchange and Chicago  does  not  strictly  follow  a  martingale  se-
Board  of  Trade  annual  statistical  hand-  quence because expected changes  in mar-
books.  ket returns [E(R,)] are zero if the sequence
Denoting successive  values of the series  follows  a martingale:
of commodity futures  returns by Rt,  Rt+±,
... ,  RT,  one  can  estimate  the  autocorre-
lation function  by:  E[(Rt+,  - R)  I ,] = E(t) = 0  (2)
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where  0t  is a general symbol  for the rele-
vant  set of information  at time  t.  Expres-
sion  (2)  states that if the  returns  follow  a
martingale  model,  then the expected  val-
ue  of  a  one-period  change  in  market  re-
turns  is  independent  of  all  past  informa-
tion and  thus,  for an efficient  market,  all
of  the  Pk  coefficients  should  be  close  to
zero.
Table  1 presents estimates  of the serial
correlation  coefficients  (pk's) for k =  1,  . . .
24  for  barley  and  corn  futures  returns.
There  are  24  estimated  coefficients  for
each year 1977-81.  The first  row for each
year  in Table  1 contains  estimates for k =
1,  ... ,  12 and the  second row for k =  13,
. . .,  24.  For  the  most part  the  estimated
coefficients are relatively small in absolute
value and  this suggests serial  dependence
is  not  evident  in  either  market.  We  can,
therefore, conclude that the barley futures
market is just as efficient  as the corn mar-
ket based on this test.
In  addition  to an  estimate  of  the  ran-
domness of returns (which appears in  Ta-
ble  1),  it is also of interest to compare the
variability  of daily  market  returns  in the
Winnipeg  and  Chicago  futures  markets.
It  is  commonly  assumed  that  less  active
markets, such as barley, exhibit more price
volatility  than  more  active  markets,  such
as  corn.  On  the  other  hand,  some  of  the
Canadian  regulations may  result in great-
er price stability  on the barley market be-
cause they  implicitly  provide  price  floors
and ceilings  from time to time.
Table  2 reports  the  coefficient  of  vari-
ation for  daily  December  futures  returns
over  the  1977-81  period.  The coefficient
of variation is the square  root of the vari-
ance of the returns divided by their mean
and the higher this statistic the  more vol-
atile  the  random  variable  in  question.
From  the  table  we  find  on  average  the
variability  of returns  on Chicago  corn  fu-
tures is higher than for barley futures.  The
inference  is that the regulations in Canada
do serve  to reduce the variance  of barley
futures  prices.  Within  each  market  the
TABLE 2.  Variability of Daily Market  Returnsa
December  Futures:  1977-81.
Com-  Coefficient of
modity  Year  Variationb












a Returns  were computed  as  the first differences  be-
tween  the  natural  logarithms  of daily  December  fu-
tures prices.
b Defined  as the standard deviation divided by the ab-
solute value of the mean.
levels  of variability from year  to year are
also very different and this makes it more
difficult  to  generalize  about  price  vari-
ability  both within and between  markets.
Analysis  of Long-Run  Market Returns:
The Theory of Market Bias
The Winnipeg futures market has often
been  characterized  as  a  "thin"  market,
which  means  that  trading  is  light  or,  in
other  words,  there  is  insufficient  hedger
and speculator interest in the market.  Lack
of sufficient trading volumes plagues many
futures  contracts  during  their  growing
stages.  For  example,  in  the  early  1950s,
the soybean contract on the Chicago Board
of Trade lacked trading interest but today
is  one  of the  most  highly  active  markets
in the  world.
A thin grain futures market tends to fa-
vour  buyers  of contracts  over  sellers  be-
cause  in  such  a  market  there  is  often  a
good deal of short selling by hedgers which
does not attract a sufficient amount of long
buying  by  speculators.  The  consequence
of more sellers than buyers  is a depressed
price and  thus  for distant  futures  months
5
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TABLE 3.  Results of Routine Buying Programs in Barley and  Corn  Futures:  1974-81.
Price at  Average
Beginning  Profit
Dates of  and Ending  Number  Per Trade
Speculative  First  Purchase  Dates ($  of  ($  per
Commodity  Market  Position  and Last  Sale  per bushel)  Trades  bushel)  t-Ratio
Winnipeg  Long only  Oct. 1, 1974-  $2.87  32  $0.03  .64
Barley  Dec.  1, 1981  $2.55
Winnipeg  Long  and Short  Oct. 1, 1974-  $2.87  32  -$0.05  .86
Barley  Dec.  1, 1981  $2.55
Chicago  Long only  Sept. 3,  1974-  $3.32  36  -$0.07  1.07
Corn  Dec.  1,1981  $2.66
Chicago  Long and Short  Sept. 3,  1974-  $3.32  36  -$0.04  .89
Corn  Dec.  1,1981  $2.66
in  a thin  market the contract  prices  may
be underestimates  of their  true value.
The  theory  of  normal  backwardation
suggests that if a market  is persistently fa-
vouring the "longs"  over the "shorts" then
a  speculative  strategy  of  maintaining  a
long position in the futures market should
earn  positive  profits  over  time.  The  hy-
pothetical Gray trading routine was tested
in this  section  and it  involves  purchasing
each  futures  contract  on the  first  trading
day  in the  delivery  month of the preced-
ing futures  contract and then selling  it on
the  first  trading  day  of  its  own  delivery
month. For example,  on October  1,  1974,
the December  (1974) futures contract was
purchased;  the December  (1974) contract
was  subsequently  sold  on  December  2,
1974,  and  the  May  (1975)  contract  was
simultaneously  purchased.  Then,  on May
1,  1975,  the  May  contract  was  sold  and
the  July  contract  was  purchased,  and  so
on.  The routine  strategy  was  initiated  on
October  1,  1974  and  terminated  on  De-
cember  1,  1981  and  the  results  are  dis-
played  in Table  3.  The data  set used  for
this test of normal backwardation  was ex-
panded  to three  years  beyond  that  used
for  the  martingale  hypothesis  primarily
because this section  is a  test for  long-run
market behavior.  Recall  that  the  martin-
gale hypothesis is related to very short-run
price behavior.
In  addition  to the  Gray  routine,  Coot-
ner's interpretation of the theory was also
tested.  This  involved  a similar hypotheti-
cal buying and selling routine  except that
speculators were assumed  to go long  only
after the peak  of short  hedging following
the harvest period. The results reported in
Table  3  for  the  long  and  short  positions
(the  Cootner  test)  assumed  speculators
were short in the barley  market from Oc-
tober  1  through  December  1,  otherwise
they  were  long.  In  corn,  they  were  as-
sumed  to  be  short  from  September  1
through  December  1, and  otherwise  long.
For  the  long  only  routine,  an average
profit  of  $0.03  per  bushel  per  trade  for
barley  futures  was  earned  before broker-
age fees.  This profit  is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero because  its t-ratio  is 0.64
and the level at which the null hypothesis
of a zero profit is rejected  is a 0.05 t-value
of  2.0.  A  similar routine  strategy  applied
to the corn futures market in  Chicago re-
sulted  in  a  negative  average  return  of
$0.07  per bushel.  Statistically,  this  figure
is  not  different  from  zero  either.  These
results are to be expected  in an active fu-
tures  market  where  the  Keynesian  risk
premium  is bid  close to zero.
The long  and short  trading routine did
not result in improved  average  profits for
barley  and  it  only  improved  corn  profits
marginally.  Barley profits  fell from  $0.03
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(per bushel)  per trade to -$0.05 per trade
while  corn  rose  from  -$0.07  to  -$0.04.
These results allow for both long and short
speculative  positions  and  they  are  also  a
rejection  of  the  theory  of  normal  back-
wardation  for barley  and corn.
The  information  in  Table  3  thus indi-
cates  the  Winnipeg  barley  market  is  not
persistently  biased  in  favor  of the  specu-
lators over the hedgers under the assump-
tion  that  speculators  are  generally  net
buyers  and hedgers are net sellers.  Profits
from  maintaining  a  long  position  in  the
barley market between  1974 and  1981 are
not  statistically  different  from  zero  and
based  on this evidence the  barley market
cannot  be considered  a thin market  rela-
tive to corn.
Quality of  Price Information:
Forecasting Ability
One  further  measure  of  how  well  the
barley  futures  market  is  performing  as  a
price-determining  institution  is  to test  its
forecasting ability. Jerome  Stein has shown
there  is  a  direct  connection  between  fu-
tures  price  forecast  errors  and  economic
welfare.  He  suggests  that  the forecasting
accuracy  of  the  futures  price  is  a  more
valid  and  worthwhile  measure  of market
efficiency  than  is  a  statistical  test  of  the
stochastic nature of futures prices because
a  poor  price  forecast  will result in  misal-
located resources.
The  forecasting  accuracy  of the  Win-
nipeg  barley  and  Chicago  corn  futures
markets is estimated in this section by the
mean  square  prediction  error 3 (MSE) for
each  series  over  a number  of  crop years.
The lower the MSE, the more accurate the
price  forecast.  The  time  period  studied
3 If one  has n pairs  of predicted and actual  prices,  Pi
and  A,,  respectively,  then the  mean square predic-
tion  error  (MSE)  for  the  set  of  all  n  crop  years  is
given  by:
MSE  = - (Pi-  A) 2.
n  i=l
TABLE  4.  Planting  Time  and  Post-Harvest
Feed  Barley  and  Corn  Prices:
1975-81  ($ per metric ton).
Planting-  Post-  Planting-  Post-
Time  Harvest  Time  Harvest
Barley  Barley  Corn  Corn
Futures  Futures  Futures  Futures
Year  Pricea  Priceb  Pricec  Priced
1975  96.91  110.23  100.78  100.39
1976  99.94  91.70  103.54  94.48
1977  92.60  75.00  101.96  86.61
1978  77.10  74.10  96.45  86.61
1979  89.10  118.00  107.47  106.69
1980  113.40  155.00  116.53  143.30
1981  154.50  120.90  147.63  98.03
Mean  Square
Error  608.40  513.15
a Price  of December  barley  futures on  or about  April
30th.
b Closing  December  barley  futures  price,  end  of  De-
cember.
c  Price of December corn futures on or about April 30th.
d Closing December  corn futures price, end of Decem-
ber.
Source:  Winnipeg  Commodity  Exchange,  Statistical
Annual  (various  issues).  Chicago  Board  of
Trade,  Statistical Annual (various issues).
closely corresponds  to that in the study of
long-run market returns in Table 3. There
is not an exact correspondence  because this
section  is  forecasting  seasonal  price  per-
formance.
Table  4  reports  the  time  series  chosen
to represent  price  forecasts  and the  MSE
results.  The  planting-time  barley  futures
price  forecast  is taken  as the price  of De-
cember  barley  futures  at  planting  time.
For  the  1975-76  crop  year,  the  price  of
December barley futures on May 27,  1975
is the forecast of the post-harvest price for
that  year.  The  planting-time  date  varies
because  in  1975 and  1978  December bar-
ley  futures  were  not  traded  until  the
month of May.  For the other years,  April
30  was  chosen  as  the  planting-time  date
and  the April  30  prices of  the December
futures contracts were also chosen for corn.
The computed MSEs for the barley and
corn forecasts  are 608.40  and  513.15,  re-
spectively.  These results  indicate that the
7
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Chicago  corn  futures  does  a superior  job
of  indicating  post-harvest  prices  com-
pared  with  the  Winnipeg  barley  futures
market. Using Stein's criterion for market
efficiency, these figures thus show the bar-
ley  futures  market  to  be inefficient  rela-
tive to the corn market.
Upon  further  examination  of Table  4,
it is clear that the barley market provided
a  particularly  low  price  forecast  in  the
spring of 1979.4 It was low relative  to corn
primarily  because the Canadian  domestic
market  was  burdened  with  barley  stocks
at the time and the  CWB could  not  ade-
quately  arbitrage  the domestic and inter-
national  markets  because  of  reported
transportation  problems  (CWB).  Recall
that the barley futures price  is for domes-
tic  transactions  only  and  thus  in  1979  it
was  reflecting  domestic  conditions  which
were  those of  surplus supply.  The  1978-
79  barley  carryover  to  production  ratio
was 0.31,  which  is approximately  double
the normal level. The barley futures price
was, therefore, not reflective of world sup-
ply and demand  conditions  at the time.
The inference  from  Table  4 is  that in-
stitutional  rigidities  which  periodically
separate the Canadian barley  market from
the  world  market  adversely  affect  the
pricing  efficiency  of  the  barley  futures
market.
The  relatively  poor  price  information
transformed  in  the  spring  of  1979  im-
pacted on barley production levels  as bar-
ley acreage  fell  by  about  12 percent  and
then  subsequently  barley  carryover  was
historically  low at the end of the 1979-80
crop  year.  Had  there  been  proper  arbi-
trage  between  the  domestic  and  world
markets that year, the futures price would
4 Excluding the 1979 forecasts from the MSE analysis
in Table  5 provides  a MSE  of 570.6 for  barley  and
598.57  for corn,  which  implies  barley  becomes  the
more efficient  market.  Had  it not  been  for the  in-
ability of  the market  to reflect  world  conditions  in
the  spring  of  1979,  the  results  on  forecasting  effi-
ciency would be consistent  with the other efficiency
tests in this  paper.
have provided a higher price forecast and
farmers  would  have  produced  more  bar-
ley.  As  a  consequence,  they  would  have
had  a greater  opportunity  to take  advan-
tage  of  attractive  prices  in  the  1979-80
crop year.
Basis  Behavior and  Hedging
Opportunities
The traditional  purpose  and benefit  of
producer  hedging5 on the futures market
is  to minimize  possible  revenue  losses  as-
sociated  with  adverse cash price changes.
By  taking equal but  opposite  positions  in
the cash and futures market, hedgers "play
off"  price  fluctuations  in  the  markets
against one another and the effect of price
variability on their income level is thereby
neutralized.
One can  define  the hedging activity  as
exchanging  price  risk  for  basis  risk;  the
basis being defined  as the  nearby  futures
price  minus  the cash  price.  The textbook
example  of a perfect  hedge occurs  when
cash and futures prices  are perfectly  cor-
related and thus the basis does not change
from the time the hedge  is placed  until it
is  lifted.  Normally,  the  basis  does  have
some  variability,  however,  and  hedging
cannot completely  eliminate  price risk.  It
will reduce  price risk,  but only as  long as
the  basis  variability  is  less  than  the  cash
price variability.
In  order  to  study  the  effectiveness  of
hedging, weekly price data were collected
for  feed  barley  and  corn  for  the  August
1977-December  1981  period.  It  was  as-
sumed that hedging would be carried out
on  a  near-term  futures  contract  no closer
than  six  to  eight  weeks  away.  The  data
include mid-week  closing prices for near-
term  WCE  barley  futures,  Thunder  Bay
cash barley prices, Manitoba  barley street
5 Alternative  motives  for  hedging  arise  from  either
anticipating  favorable  basis  changes  or attempts  to




TABLE 5.  Level and Variability of Feed  Barley
Mid-Week  closing Prices:  1977-81
($ per tonne).
Standard
Price  Series  Mean  Deviation
Near-Term  Thunder
Bay  Barley
Futures"  107.65  28.52
Thunder  Bay Cashb  107.44  28.32
Montreal Cashc  128.64  32.57
Manitoba Streetd  88.18  27.06
Alberta Streete  85.01  26.94
Near-Term  Chicago
Board of Trade
Corn  Futures'  112.97  21.09
North-Central
Illinois Cashs  99.16  19.23
Montreal Basis  -20.61  4.92
Thunder  Bay  Basis  .21  3.86
Manitoba Basis  19.55  3.88
Alberta  Basis  22.63  4.32
Illinois Basis  13.80  5.02
a Closing  price of futures  contract  used  by line eleva-
tor companies  to arrive  at the  street price.  The ex-
piry date of the nearby contract is normally  not clos-
er than six to eight weeks away. Source:  United Grain
Growers daily price cards.
b No. 1  feed barley.  Source: Winnipeg Commodity  Ex-
change,  Statistical Annual (various issues).
C.I.F.  Montreal  price for  No.  1 feed  barley.  Source:
Livestock Feed  Board of Canada.
d No. 1 feed barley. Source:  U.G.G.  daily price cards.
No. 1  feed  barley. Source:  U.G.G.  daily price cards.
Closing price of nearby Chicago Board of Trade corn
futures contract. The  expiry date of the nearby con-
tract is not closer than  90 days away.  Source:  Chi-
cago  Board  of Trade,  Statistical Annual (various is-
sues).
g  North-Central  Illinois  bid  cash corn  price (No.  2 yel-
low). Source:  U.S.D.A.,  Grain and Feed Market News.
nois.  Table  5  presents  a summary  of  sta-
tistical information  on  these various  price
series for barley and corn. The table gives
the mean  and standard deviation  for each
price  series.
If  we  define  price  risk  as  price  vari-
ability  then  we  can  informally  evaluate
the usefulness  of these futures markets for
hedging  by  comparing  the  ratio  of  basis
risk  to  price  risk.  The  smaller  this  ratio
the more useful the market is as a hedging
mechanism.  From  Table  5  we  find  that
the  basis  risk  is  much  smaller  than  the
price  risk  for  each  of  the  series.  This  is
measured  by the ratio of the standard de-
viation  of  the  basis  to that  of  the  price.
The ratios are small and in the range from
0.14  to 0.16  and  thus  for any  one  of the
delivery points represented in Table 5 the
barley  and  corn  futures  market  can  be
used to reduce  exposure to price  variabil-
ity.
To more formally  test the effectiveness
of hedging, following Ederington, one can
show that a measure of the minimum-risk
hedge ratio  X* and  hedging  effectiveness
(E*)  is  a  function  of  the  covariance  be-
tween  cash  (or  street)  and  futures  price
changes and the variance of futures price
changes.  Once  the  crop  is  planted  or  in
store,  the  objective  function  for the  risk-
averse  hedger,  aiming  to  reduce  price
variability,  is:
min Var(PH,)  =  Var(P,,) + XfVar(P,,)X;
+ 2XfCov(P,,,P,,) (3)
s.t.:
prices,  Montreal  cash  barley  prices,  Al-
berta  barley  street  prices,  CBT  corn  fu-
tures  and  Illinois  cash  corn  prices.  The
street prices in western Canada were those
quoted  by  United  Grain  Growers,  a
farmer-owned  grain company,  which  has
operations  throughout  the prairies.  These
street  prices  are bids at  rural primary  el-
evators  and are  assumed  to  be represen-
tative of those offered to farmers by com-
mercial grain companies. The Illinois corn
prices  are  cash  bids  in  north-central  Illi-
PH, = E(P,,)  + XE(P,,) (4)
where  Pst and Pft are, respectively,  the cash
(or street)  and  futures price changes  dur-
ing  period  t.  The target change  in  value
of the  portfolio  of  cash and  futures  posi-
tions  during  period  t  is  equal  to  Ph, and
the proportion of the commodity which is
hedged  equals  Xf,  with  X* being  the op-
timal  hedge  ratio.  It  is assumed  the  pro-
portion  of  the  cash  commodity  held  in
storage  is  fixed  at  1.0  and,  therefore,  it
9
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does  not  appear  explicitly  in  the  expres-
sion.  The  maximum  reduction  in  price
variance  is  achieved  by  hedging  an
amount equal  to  Xf.
The first order condition for the hedger
is:
a Var(PHt)  = 2XfVar(Pf)  + 2  Cov(P,, Pf)  = 0.  (5)
aXf
Solving  (5)  for the optimal  ratio  we have:
_  -Cov(P,, Pf)
Var(Pf)
(6)
From  (6) we find the optimal hedge ra-
tio equals the  negative  of the slope  coef-
ficient  of a  regression  of  Pst  on  Pf.  In ad-
dition,  the  coefficient  of  determination
from this  regression  gives  us  an estimate
of E;,  the  measure  of hedging  effective-
ness.  The  coefficient  of  determination
measures  the  proportion  of  the  variance
in  cash  price  changes  that  futures  price
changes  explain.  Assuming  the  optimal
hedge is carried,  E* can thus be interpret-
ed  as  the  average  proportional  reduction
in price  change variance  that could  have
been realized  by hedging.
The results of an analysis of the hedging
effectiveness  of  barley  and  corn  futures
for the 1977-81  period are given in Table
6.  An  ordinary  least squares regression  of
the form in (7)  was run on mid-week  cash
and futures price  changes.
P, = a + P Pf,  + Ec  (7)
For  hedge  ratios  set  equal  to the  esti-
mated  f  coefficients,  the  R2 values  give
the  proportionate  reduction  of price  risk
attainable.  For example,  a hedger  selling
on the  Alberta  street  market,  who  main-
tained 86  percent  of  his  barley inventory
hedged, would have reduced his price risk
by  58  percent  between  1977  and  1981.
The reason the minimum  risk hedge ratio
is smaller than  100 percent  is that,  on av-
erage, the street price changes proportion-
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Cash  Market  (t-Value)  (t-Value)  R 2 d.w.
Thunder  Bay Barley  .03  .74  .47  2.16
(.18)  (13.52)
Montreal  Barley  .12  .61  .40  1.98
(.72)  (11.22)
Manitoba Barley  .00  .83  .60  2.25
(-.02)  (17.62)
Alberta Barley  .03  .86  .58  2.31
(.23)  (17.05)
Illinois Corn  .00  .60  .35  2.18
(.23)  (11.15)
ately less than the futures price from week
to week.  The direction of change  of street
and futures prices is similar,  however.
Hedging stocks in the Thunder Bay cash
barley  market  is  shown  in  Table  6  to be
less  effective  than hedging  at  rural deliv-
ery  points in  other  parts of western  Can-
ada.  It is estimated  that with the  optimal
hedge,  a hedger  would  have  reduced  his
price  risk  by 47  percent  in Thunder  Bay
compared  with between  58 to  60 percent
in  the  rural  country  markets  of  Alberta
and  Manitoba.  The  E* estimate  for  Mon-
treal barley is 40 percent compared to the
rural Illinois corn  estimate  of  35 percent.
The  basis  on  the  Canadian  prairies  is
very stable compared with the other mar-
kets in Table  6 for two major reasons. The
first  is  that  the  majority  of  rural  open-
market  commercial  barley  sales  are  des-
tined for only the one terminal position in
Thunder  Bay.  In  the  U.S.,  on  the  other
hand,  the corn  basis  is more  variable  be-
cause there are many different competing
terminal  destinations  for the  commodity.
A  second  factor  explaining  the  relative
stability of the Canadian rural basis is that
the  freight  and  elevation  costs  are  regu-
lated  by the  federal  government  and  are
essentially  fixed from year to year. On the
July 1984Barley Futures
TABLE  7.  Estimates
1977-81.
of  Hedging  Effectiveness  Allowing  for  Changing  /0  Coefficients:
Regression Coefficients
^~~~~~~~Cash  ,(t-Values  in Parentheses) Cash
Market  a  3,1  2  3  34  /5  R
2 d.w.
Thunder  Bay  .04  1.01  .16  -. 42  -. 24  -. 35  .49  2.11
Barley  (.25)  (3.33)  (.42)  (-1.29)  (-.76)  (-1.08)
Montreal  .13  .99  -. 26  -. 51  -. 34  -. 47  .41  1.95
Barley  (.72)  (3.69)  (-.73)  (-1.70)  (-1.20)  (-1.59)
Manitoba  .01  1.16  -. 26  -. 59  -. 21  -. 40  .62  2.14
Barley  (.08)  (4.50)  (-.81)  (-2.13)  (-.79)  (-1.46)
Alberta  .06  .52  .49  .10  .44  .36  .60  2.24
Barley  (.43)  (.187)  (1.42)  (.34)  (1.51)  (1.21)
Illinois  .00  .67  .18  .07  .08  -. 32  .39  2.18
Corn  (-.33)  (2.96)  (.63)  (.30)  (.31)  (-1.32)
other hand, these major components  of the
basis  are  determined  by  supply  and  de-
mand  factors  in the  U.S.  and  thus the  Il-
linois basis  is more variable.
It is also  worthwhile  to explore the ex-
tent  to  which  the  estimated  minimum
variance hedge ratio f  in  Table 6 is stable
from  year  to  year.  Since  we  are  dealing
with time  series  data, the  stability  of  the
estimated  parameters can  be investigated
with the use of dummy explanatory  vari-
ables.
We  can  accomplish  this  by  rewriting
equation  (7) as:
Ps, =  a  +  1, P,, +  2.  D,  Pf,  +  3. D2 Pf, +  4'-D 3'Pft
+ f5-D 4 'Pft  + q  (8)
where:
D  =  1 for observations  in  1978
=  0  otherwise
D2=  1  for observations  in  1979
=  0  otherwise
D3 =  1 for observations  in  1980
=  0  otherwise
D4  =  1 for observations  in  1981
=  0  otherwise.
The  0f2,  fs3,  1f4  and  f5  coefficients  in
equation  (8) measure differences  in slopes
from year  to  year  and the ordinary  least
squares result for  equation  (8)  are shown
in Table  7.
With the inclusion  of  the dummy vari-
ables the R2 is slightly higher for all of the
price  series.  The  f  coefficients  associated
with the dummy variables are for the most
part statistically  insignificant.  Using the  5
percent  level  of significance  the only  ex-
ception  is f3 for Manitoba  barley.
Using  Manitoba  barley  as  an  example,
the interpretation  of these results indicate
that in 1978 the optimal hedge would have
been f/  +  f2 = 0.90  (which  is  90  percent
of the inventory level)  and the consequent
reduction  in price variance  62 percent.
In general,  these estimates support those
found in Table 6. There is some slight evi-
dence  of  instability  in  the  f  coefficients
but  the  level  of  hedging  effectiveness  is
found to be high. Hedging barley in west-
ern  Canada  results  in  a  greater  propor-
tionate  reduction  in  cash  price  variance
than does hedging  corn  in Illinois.
Conclusions
The pricing efficiency  and  hedging  ef-
fectiveness  of  the  feed  barley  grain  fu-
tures market in Canada  has been  the sub-
ject of this study. The Chicago corn market
was  used  as  a  norm  and  both  the  inter-
temporal  and  spatial  behavior  of  futures
and cash  prices were  analyzed.  A  market
is deemed  price efficient  if it  rapidly and
11
CarterWestern Journal of Agricultural  Economics
accurately  adjusts  to  a  particular  infor-
mation  set.  Hedging  effectiveness  was
measured by the stability  of the basis.
Several  weak-form  tests,  such  as  serial
correlation  analyses,  price  variability
analyses  and  price-trend  analyses,  were
performed on the barley and corn market
prices.  For  the  most  part,  the  results  of
these  statistical  tests  did  not  allow  us  to
reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  barley  fu-
tures  market  is  efficient.  However,  be-
cause efficiency  is always defined  relative
to  some  particular  information  set,  these
results indicate the market does a good job
of  reflecting  Canadian  domestic  infor-
mation  on supply and demand.
To  test  the  market's  adjustment  to  in-
formation  on  world  supply  and  demand
conditions,  the  planting-time  forecasting
ability  of  barley  futures  was  compared
with  corn.  It  was  clearly  shown  that  in
1979 the WCE was inefficient in terms of
being  able  to accurately  forecast  prices.
During  this  period there  was  inadequate
arbitrage  between the Canadian domestic
and  world  feed  grain  markets  and  the
WCE  did  a  relatively  poor  job  of  fore-
casting  prices.  The  results  of  this  paper
provide  empirical  support  to  the  notion
that the performance  of a futures  market
is  largely determined  by  the institutional
environment  it operates  within.
Finally, the barley market was found to
have a relatively stable basis and the rural
markets displayed a less variable basis than
the terminal  Thunder  Bay market.  Over-
all,  hedging rural cash barley  on the bar-
ley futures market reduces price risk more
effectively  than  does hedging  rural  corn
on  the corn futures  market.
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